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ABSTRACT
Many smartphone apps transmit personally identifiable in-
formation (PII), often without the user’s knowledge. To ad-
dress this issue, we present PrivacyProxy, a system that
monitors outbound network traffic and generates app-specific
signatures to represent sensitive data being shared. Priva-
cyProxy uses a crowd-based approach to detect likely PII in
an adaptive and scalable manner by anonymously combin-
ing signatures from different users of the same app. Further-
more, we do not observe users’ network traffic and instead
rely on hashed signatures. We present the design and imple-
mentation of PrivacyProxy and evaluate it with a lab study,
a field deployment, a user survey, and a comparison against
prior work. Our field study shows PrivacyProxy can auto-
matically detect PII with an F1 score of 0.885. PrivacyProxy
also achieves an F1 score of 0.759 in our controlled experi-
ment for the 500 most popular apps. The F1 score also im-
proves to 0.866 with additional training data for 40 apps that
initially had the most false positives. We also show perfor-
mance overhead of using PrivacyProxy is between 8.6% to
14.2%, slightly more than using a standard unmodified VPN,
and most users report no perceptible impact on battery life
or the network.
1. INTRODUCTION
NIST defines personally identifiable information (PII)
as “any information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity” [1]. Prior work has shown
that many smartphone apps aggressively collect PII [2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. While PII can be used to provide
useful services, it is often also used to track users’ be-
haviors without their consent, potentially by multiple
third-party trackers and across different apps [9, 10].
A recent study looked at the evolution and updates to
popular apps over time and in fact found that PII be-
ing accessed by some apps has actually been increasing
in newer versions [11], with many apps showing no im-
provements. Being able to detect PII in a reliable and
scalable manner would offer many opportunities for im-
proving privacy, e.g. scrubbing PII before it leaves a
user’s device or allowing a third party to assign privacy
grades to apps based on the pervasiveness and sensitiv-
ity of the data being collected.
Focusing on Android, it is well known that any app
can access the unique, per-device Android ID [12] with-
out an Android permission. Apps and third-party li-
braries can also generate their own unique identifiers.
Furthermore, identifiers may not always have predictable
names or formats, making it hard to have a comprehen-
sive blacklist based on regular expressions. Adding to
the complexity of protecting PII on Android is the per-
vasive use of third-party libraries [10, 13]. Lin et al.
show that a typical Android app uses 1.59 (std = 2.82)
third-party libraries [13]. Libraries within the same app
can access the same PII, but for different purposes. For
example, an app might contain two libraries that use
location, one for maps and the other for ads. This
means enforcing PII access control on a per-app basis
may not suit the user’s needs. Furthermore, Chitkara
et al. found that the top-100 most popular third-party
libraries account for over 70% of all sensitive data ac-
cesses across the apps they tested [10], using their app
on a rooted smartphone. This finding suggests that
denying PII access for one app is not necessarily effec-
tive, since a given third-party library might be embed-
ded in other apps that the user has.
To address these problems, we present PrivacyProxy,
a privacy-sensitive approach for automatically inferring
likely PII using network analysis and crowdsourcing.
Like other proxy-based approaches [7, 8, 14], we use
a VPN to intercept and analyze smartphone network
data, thus avoiding having to modify apps or make
changes to the OS. However, instead of routing all of
the user’s network traffic to a remote server for anal-
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ysis (like ReCon [7]), PrivacyProxy looks for key-value
pairs in HTTP requests on the smartphone itself and
only sends cryptographically hashed signatures to our
servers, thereby minimizing potential privacy and secu-
rity risks. Each signature represents the content of a re-
quest to a remote host without revealing actual content,
letting us identify potential PII based on the uniqueness
of a signature. Additionally, instead of requiring hard-
coded rules or regular expressions (like PrivacyGuard
[8] or HayStack [14]), or requiring users to label net-
work traces for training (like ReCon [7]), our approach
is adaptive and robust against some forms of data ob-
fuscation such as hashing a PII or encoding it. Fur-
thermore, we show that as PrivacyProxy observes more
network requests, we can classify PII more accurately.
Lastly, since the PII detection and signature generation
happen on device, PrivacyProxy also provides controls
to the user to allow or block PII at a fine granularity,
while maintaining a small trusted computing base. In
summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present a privacy-sensitive approach that uses
network analysis and crowdsourcing to detect likely
PII leaked by apps without requiring any changes
to apps or the OS. Our approach uses a novel and
adaptive way of detecting PII without relying on
a priori knowledge of names or formats of identi-
fiers. Furthermore, our approach does not require
labeled network traces or any user intervention.
• We present the results of a controlled experiment,
a field deployment, a user survey, and a compari-
son against two pieces of past work. PrivacyProxy
achieved a F1 score of 0.759 in the controlled ex-
periment (500 apps) and 0.885 in the field deploy-
ment (191 apps). For the 40 apps with the most
false positives, we show that as additional network
requests are observed, the F1 score improves to
0.866. We also show the trade-off between preci-
sion and recall. Furthermore, we show that Priva-
cyProxy finds more kinds of PII than past work.
Finally, our user survey shows that 85% and 68%
of users perceived no change in battery life and
network performance respectively.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Many types of data can be characterized as PII, e.g.
name, street address, IP address, photos, fingerprints,
race, and religion [1]. We take a narrow view of PII,
focusing primarily on unique identifiers, such as user
names, Android ID, IMEI, MAC, Advertising ID, phone
numbers, identifiers generated by apps or libraries (e.g.
Java’s UUID class or hashing one’s MAC address), and
likely identifiers, such as install time of an app. Here,
we limit the scope of identifiers to just single values.
We group prior work into three categories: (1) code
analysis techniques, which aim to improve privacy be-
havior of mobile apps by analyzing the apps’ source code
or binaries; (2) approaches that modify the underlying
mobile OS; and (3) network flow analysis techniques to
detect and remove PII.
Code Analysis: Static analysis approaches iden-
tify the uses of sensitive information by analyzing an
app’s source code or binary. FlowDroid [15] and Droid-
Safe [16] are information-flow analysis tools that, given
a set of sources and sinks, can statically identify possi-
ble PII leaks. AndroidLeaks [17] uses taint-aware slic-
ing to find potential PII leaks. PrivacyGrade [13, 18]
infers the purpose behind each permission request for
Android apps by decompiling apps and searching for
sensitive API calls made by third-party libraries. Wang
et.al. [19] used text mining on decompiled apps to infer
the purpose of permission use for location and contact
lists. These approaches do not change the functionality
of the app at runtime and do not provide PII filtering,
but rather are used to inform users and developers of
potential data leaks. These techniques also fail to work
in the presence of dynamic code loading [20] and re-
flection techniques. Additionally, these techniques can
only detect access to sensitive data using well-defined
permissions or APIs rather than arbitrary identifiers an
app might generate, which we show is quite common.
Instrumenting the OS and APIs: Another ap-
proach is to modify the underlying OS and intercept
certain APIs that access private user data. For exam-
ple, ProtectMyPrivacy [2, 10] and xPrivacy [21] inter-
cept OS API calls requesting sensitive information and
alert the user. Mockdroid [22] modifies the Android OS
so it can substitute private data with mock data. Taint-
Droid [4] offers a custom Android version that does dy-
namic taint-tracking, enabling information flow track-
ing from sources (requests for sensitive information) to
sinks. AppTracer[23] uses binary rewriting to determine
if sensitive resource usages happen due to user interac-
tions in applications or not. While these approaches
augment native privacy protection features of iOS and
Android, their applicability is limited to rooted or jail-
broken devices. PrivacyBlocker [24] uses static analysis
on app binaries and replaces calls for private data with
hard coded shadow data. This approach, however, re-
quires target apps to be re-written and reinstalled and
cannot be done at runtime.
PrivacyProxy offers a complementary approach, and
one that works with unmodified devices with the stock
OS, and unchanged Apps. In addition, PrivacyProxy
only relies on VPN functionality, which is likely to be
continually supported in the future versions of these
OSes due to its enterprise use. In addition, our ap-
proach can detect an expanded set of PII, including
those generated by apps themselves, and not just ones
that are accessible using well known OS APIs.
Network Flow Analysis: The closest related work
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is network flow analysis, which seeks to detect (and in
some cases remove) PII as it leaves a device. Privacy
Oracle uses differential black-box fuzz testing to detect
leaks [25], feeding different sets of inputs to an app and
looking for associated changes in network traffic. Simi-
larly, Agrigento [26] uses black box differential analysis
to observe whether the network traffic of an app changes
when certain known types of PII (such as location or an
ID) are modified or kept the same. However, these ap-
proaches are hard to scale up because there are millions
of smartphone apps, and one must generate multiple
sets of inputs per app. In contrast, PrivacyProxy’s novel
signature-based detection algorithm scales much better
and the accuracy of inferences improves as the number
of users increase. Also, PrivacyProxy uses valid net-
work requests based on users’ regular use of their apps
rather than generating inputs or modifying well-known
PII, which increases the possibility of finding more PII
due to increased coverage.
AntMonitor uses the Android VPN service to send
network traces to their server, while allowing users to
disable traffic at the app level, and choose whether all
data or just headers are sent [27]. PrivacyGuard [8] and
Haystack [14] use Android’s VPN Service API to inter-
cept network traffic for privacy. However, they both rely
on regular expressions to find potential PII, limiting the
types of PII they can detect. For example, an app might
generate its own identifier or use non-standard encod-
ings. Recon [7] uses a VPN to redirect all user traffic to
a proxy in the cloud and uses heuristics to identify po-
tential PII, which could lead to privacy concerns itself.
In contrast, PrivacyProxy offers a hybrid approach,
where data is processed locally on the user’s smartphone
and only hashed data is sent to PrivacyProxy servers.
PrivacyProxy identifies likely PII based on the unique-
ness of the data. Additionally, the PrivacyProxy server
does not see any actual user data, mitigating privacy
and security concerns that users may have about their
sensitive data leaving the confines of their device. Fi-
nally, PrivacyProxy is more robust to changes in for-
mats of the data compared to other approaches. In Sec-
tion 5, we evaluate PrivacyProxy against both a regular
expression based approach (Haystack [14]) as well as a
machine learning based approach (Recon [7]) showing
that PrivacyProxy can detect many more PIIs.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our overarching objective with PrivacyProxy is to
develop a practical system that increases smartphone
users’ awareness of and provide control over PII that
apps send over the network. To achieve this, we had
a number of design goals. First, to maximize utility
for everyday users, our solution must work on unrooted
devices. Second, to detect a broad range of PII, includ-
ing known trackable IDs (e.g. UUIDs, MAC addresses,
etc), and previously unknown identifiers dynamically
generated by specific apps or libraries. Third, to pro-
vide users with effective notifications and fine-grained
controls to prevent the flow of PII over the network by
blocking or anonymizing the data. Fourth, to impose
minimal performance overhead on the device while us-
ing PrivacyProxy. Fifth, to be usable in practice by
requiring only minimal user interaction for privacy de-
cisions. Finally, to be scalable with increasing number
of users and apps.
Threat Model: We assume developers are generally
honest and do not try to deliberately obfuscate their
activities. If an app uses custom app-layer encryption,
non-standard encodings, or indirect ways to track users,
we will not be able to detect PII leakage. This is a limi-
tation of all prior work in this space. Additionally, while
we handle SSL using a man-in-the-middle approach, like
other current approaches, we are unable to handle apps
that are certificate pinned. We show in our evaluation
certificate pinning is not that prevalent in practice.
3.1 Intercepting Network Traffic
To observe what data (and potential PII) is being sent
over the network, we need to intercept traffic on unmod-
ified smartphones. We also need to separate traffic into
different flows of information, taking into account indi-
vidual apps, hosts where data is being sent to, etc. To
achieve this, we build on the internal Virtual Private
Networking (VPN) service provided by most modern
smartphone OSes. Traditional VPNs intercept all de-
vice traffic and forward it over an encrypted tunnel to
another server, which can then process and/or forward
the data to the eventual destination. VPNs can operate
at multiple layers, including transport layer (SSL/TLS)
and network layer (e.g. IPSec).
We build upon PrivacyGuard [8], which does the fol-
lowing: (a) registers a Fake VPN service to intercept
all IP packets; (b) implements TCP-Forwarders and
UDP-Forwarders that implement TCP and UDP pro-
tocols; (c) instantiates a LocalServer on the smart-
phone which pretends to be the destination for all app-
server communication and acts as a man-in-the-middle
(MITM) proxy; (d) connects the LocalServer with the
actual remote server for each request and does the nec-
essary TCP handshakes; (e) passes responses from the
real server to the TCP forwarders via the LocalServer,
which in turn delivers the IP packets back to the app.
To decrypt SSL/TLS, we perform MITM SSL injec-
tion. With the user’s explicit consent, we add a trusted
root certificate on the device that lets PrivacyProxy sign
any certificate for end hosts that individual apps con-
tact, so that the LocalServer process described above
can finish the SSL handshake and decrypt packets sent
by an app on the device itself before sending the packets
through a new SSL connection with the actual server.
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Figure 1: PrivacyProxy detects likely PII using network
analysis and crowdsourcing. Users upload anonymized
private signatures of key-value pairs extracted from
their network traffic. Signatures with the same SID
are merged into a public signature. PrivacyProxy com-
pares these public signatures with the private signatures
to detect PII.
3.2 Detecting PII
3.2.1 Extracting Key-Value Pairs
After intercepting traffic with the LocalServer, we
extract Key-Value pairs. We assume most apps use
HTTP(S) RESTful APIs. Prior work found HTTP(S)
is a common protocol for client/server communication
in Android [28], with over 80% of apps having struc-
tured responses [26]. However, in our evaluations we
observe that close to 100% of the network requests made
by the Top 500 most popular apps use the HTTP(s)
protocol. Figure 2 shows an example request and ex-
tracted key-value pairs. We extract all arguments in
the request URI. We also extract key-value pairs from
HTTP headers, ignoring common headers like “Accept-
Encoding” and “Content-Type”, instead looking for un-
common headers like “X-Secret-Location-Header”. We
parse these header values as JSON, XML, or a URL,
and if that fails we treat it as text. For the message
body we use hints such as the “Content-type” header
to parse, failing which we try common formats such as
JSON, XML, and URL encoded. If that fails, we treat
the entire body as a text value and assign a fixed key
to it. Note, our scheme will not work if apps use a pro-
prietary encoding. In our tests, we observed less than
0.6% of all HTTP requests used a non-standard encod-
ing we could not parse. Our keys have prefixes such
as “U” for URLs, “H” for header, and “B” for body to
reduce conflicts. In addition, nested keys are flattened
to include all the parent keys.
3.2.2 Signature Generation from Key-Value Pairs
The next step is to detect likely PII based on ex-
tracted key-value data. A novel aspect of our technique
is to anonymously aggregate contributed data from indi-
vidual devices, generating crowdsourced signatures that
identify which data items (per app) are likely PII. The
intuition is that key-values that repeatedly appear in
the data streams from only a particular device are likely
PII, while those appearing across many devices are not.
Each device contributes signatures comprised of a
Signature ID (SID) and extracted key-value pairs. A
Signature ID, or SID is the tuple (package-name, app
version, method, host, path). For instance, in Fig-
ure 2, the HTTP request was sent from version 1.0 of the
io.example.app and would have an SID of (io.example.app,
1.0, GET, www.example.io, /api/v1). SIDs let us asso-
ciate signatures for the same app/requests from differ-
ent users’ devices. The ‘host’ and ‘path’ fields lets us
further distinguish the end-point of PII transmission.
The other part of a signature contains all the key-
value pairs with the same SID. For each extracted key,
we store a count-min sketch [29] which represents the
frequencies of all the different values associated with a
given key, as shown in Figure 2. Count-min Sketch is
like a 2-dimensional Bloom filter that estimates the fre-
quency of an event. Concretely, each count-min sketch
is a collection of r integer arrays of length n (every
element initialized to 0) and r hash functions. It sup-
ports 2 operations: increment(v) and count(v). The
increment function takes in a value v and for each array
αi(1 ≤ i ≤ r), it increments the integer at αi[hashi(v)]
by one. The count function returns an estimate of the
frequency of value v by returningmin1≤i≤r(αi[hashi(v)]).
Count-min sketch is space efficient as it only requires
r×n integers. Given any value, it will either return the
correct count or an overestimate, but never an underes-
timate. It also does not reveal actual values that were
inserted, which is good for privacy. Multiple count-min
sketches can be trivially combined by doing a element-
wise sum over each array. We use SHA-256 as the hash
function and we generate r different hash functions by
appending fixed random strings to the value v. Fur-
thermore, for each count-min sketch, we also maintain a
counter m which keeps track of the number of times the
increment function was called, regardless of the value
used. We chose r = dln 10.01e = 5 and n = d e0.05e = 55,
which theoretically ensures that if the true frequency of
v is fv, then P [count(v) ≤ fv + 0.05n] ≥ 0.99.
We generate two types of signatures. Private Signa-
tures are generated by each user on their device. Each
device periodically uploads their private signatures to
our Signature Server. Since each private signature
only contains the SID and the count-min-sketches but
not the actual key-values, it is extremely space efficient
and there are minimal privacy concerns. By combin-
ing private signatures from different users, the signature
server can generate a Public Signature which can then
be periodically downloaded by devices based on which
apps they have. To protect user privacy, we don’t au-
thenticate users and signatures. However, this opens up
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Figure 2: Signature generation process flow: (a) Our Request Parser looks for key-value pairs in app HTTP requests,
looking at request URI query parameters, HTTP headers, and body. Extracted key-value pairs are highlighted. (b)
Signature structure for the sample HTTP Request. A signature identifies the app used, destination, URL Path, and
method, plus count-min sketch for all keys. c) Count-min sketch signature for key Device ID. Count-min sketch is
a probabilistic and compact data structure for counting the frequency of different values seen for each key.
the possibility of Sybil attacks, which we discuss later.
3.2.3 Identifying Likely PII
Again, the intuition here is that a key-value pair that
is unique to and repeatedly seen on a single device is
likely PII, while a pair common to many devices is not.
For example if an app uses a device-based UUID to
track users using the key“UserID”, its value (the UUID)
is likely to be the same for requests from the same user,
but different across other users of the same app.
Let Sprivate and Spublic represent the private and pub-
lic signature for a particular SID, respectively. Let
F (S, k, v) denote the estimated frequency for the value v
associated with key k as reported by signature S. Like-
wise, let C(S, k) denote the number of values (not neces-
sarily unique) that have been inserted into signature S
for key k. For each key-value pair (k, v) extracted from
the request, let Pprivate(k, v) be the estimated proba-
bility of seeing the pair in the user’s own requests and
Ppublic(k, v) be the estimated probability of seeing the
pair across all users’ requests. We can then calculate:
Pprivate(k, v) =
F (Sprivate, k, v)
C(Sprivate, k)
We can do the same for Ppublic(k, v). Let us con-
sider the PII analysis for a given key-value pair (k, v).
For brevity, we’ll use Pprivate to refer to Pprivate(k, v)
and Ppublic to refer to Ppublic(k, v). Let T be a tunable
threshold between 0 and 1. Using these definitions, we
can classify (k, v) into 3 categories:
1. Application Constant
Pprivate ≥ T and Pprivate ≤ Ppublic
Values in this category are present in the requests of the
user as well as others. As a result, they are likely to be
the same for all the requests with the same SID. A good
example would be developer IDs used by ad libraries to
identify the apps that made the ad request.
2. Context-Sensitive Data
Pprivate < T
These values are different for different requests from a
user and are unlikely to be PII or app constants. There
are two likely explanations. The first are values dynam-
ically generated by the app, e.g. timestamps, random
numbers used by libraries such as Google Analytics to
prevent caching [30], and app-specific checksums. The
second are values associated with the user’s actions. Ex-
amples include number of minutes the screen is on or
the user’s GPS location if the user frequently moves.
3. Likely Personally Identifiable Information
Pprivate ≥ T and Pprivate > Ppublic
To be classified as PII, a value needs to be common for
a single user and rare for others. The selection of pa-
rameter T is flexible, although it should be set such that
it prevents context-sensitive values from being misclas-
sified as PII or app constants. Due to the properties of
count-min sketch, we will never underestimate Pprivate
and Ppublic. Along with theoretical guarantees on the
bounds of count(v), our PII detection algorithm is quite
conservative in determining whether a given value is PII
or not. We err somewhat on the side of higher false posi-
tives, under the assumption that more network data will
reduce likelihood of false positives. However, if we err
on the true negative side, we risk PII being leaked.
PrivacyProxy relies on crowd contributions of private
signatures. Even though we only need two users using
the same app to start making inferences about likely
PII, the true strength of our system is realized as the
number of users increases, which improves both signa-
ture coverage and accuracy.
If only one network request for a given SID is ob-
served, Pprivate will be 1. As a result, the keys might be
incorrectly marked as likely PII until more instances are
observed. The higher the number of network requests
PrivacyProxy observes for the same SID, the higher is
the likelihood of correctly classifying them as PIIs. To
account for this behavior, we introduced a Confidence
Threshold CT , which dictates the minimum number of
times a SID must be seen before PrivacyProxy starts
classifying it. This confidence threshold can also be
configured by the users depending upon their tolerance
for false positives and false negatives. We evaluate the
effect of varying confidence thresholds in Section 5.2.
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3.3 Mitigating PII Leaks
Filtering PII: Our base system does not require any
user involvement in labeling PIIs, and as we show in our
evaluation can still identify PIIs reasonably accurately.
In addition, we have an optional functionality letting
users explicitly confirm whether a value marked as PII
is correct or not. We are conservative, and only after
user confirmation do we filter the PII by identifying the
PII’s structure using regular expressions, and replacing
it with anonymous values. For example, we can de-
tect MAC addresses, hashes, IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
phone number, Social Security Number, and email ad-
dresses and use static replacements for each of them.
Currently these fake values are the same for all users.
If the value to be filtered does not match any regex,
we replace it with a set of zeros maintaining the exact
length of the original value.
Impact of Filtering on Apps: Filtering requests
to replace PII with non-PII is one feature of Priva-
cyProxy. However, this may impact app functionality
or even cause the app to crash. If filtering a PII from an
app breaks it (e.g. response code is not a HTTP/200
OK), PrivacyProxy sends the resulting response code
(e.g. HTTP/400 or HTTP/500) to the server. If re-
sponse codes for multiple users (for the same key-value
pair) indicates that filtering broke the app, we add it
to a global app-crash whitelist and display a warning to
the user about filtering that particular PII. In addition,
the user can provide feedback if filtering a particular
key-value pair made an app unusable. This information
is also sent to the server, and if multiple users report
the same key-value pair for a particular app, it can be
added to a global app-unusable whitelist. This is a con-
servative approach since it may leak PII, but keeps a
good user experience.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
Here, we describe our implementation of PrivacyProxy
on Android. Note that our approach can be ported to
any smartphone OS that exposes a VPN API. We plan
to make the source code of PrivacyProxy available once
the results have been published.
4.1 PrivacyProxy Android App
We use PrivacyGuard’s FakeVPN and LocalServer to
intercept traffic and perform MITM attack on SSL/TLS
traffic. Both PrivacyGuard [8] and PrivacyProxy use
Android’s VPNService API (added in API Level 14),
which is intended for 3rd party VPN apps. These VPN-
based apps require the BIND VPN SERVICE permis-
sion. The Android OS explicitly shows a warning to
users if an app can monitor their network traffic.
PrivacyProxy works on devices running API 15 (An-
droid 4.3) to API 23 (Android 6.0). We ported Pri-
vacyGuard to Android Studio 2.2.2 and modified 3324
Figure 3: Different components and processing steps
of PrivacyProxy, including (1) packet capture, (2) re-
quest parsing, (3) signature generation, (4) Request
filtering/marking, (5) PII detection, (6) forwarding to
destination, (7) upload/download signatures, (8) gener-
ating fake data for values marked for filtering, (9) get-
ting public signatures, and (10) host-purpose mapping,
server-whitelist from the Signature Server.
lines of code for new functionality in PrivacyProxy, e.g.
parsing HTTP requests. The rest of our app (process-
ing logic, UI, XML, and other design elements) added
another 18,475 lines of code.
Figure 3 shows the overall flow of data. App re-
quests are intercepted by the FakeVPN Service and
sent to the LocalServer (Step 1). Next, our Request
Parser (Step 2) attempts to parse each request us-
ing several known encodings (currently JSON, XML,
and URL) and if not marks it as plain text. The out-
put of this step is a set of key-value pairs. Next, our
Signature Generator (Step 3) generates private signa-
tures for the (package-name, app version, method,
host, path) tuples using count-min sketch, as explained
in Section 3. These signatures are stored in a Signature
DB on the device. The LocalServer in parallel also sends
the request to the Request Filter (Step 4), which uses
the PII Detector (Step 5) to look for PII by comparing
private signatures on the device with the public signa-
tures received from the PrivacyProxy server. Any de-
tected PII (key, values) are also stored locally on the
device in a PII DB, along with generated fake values
that they can be replaced with (Step 8). Detected PII
are shown to the user in the PrivacyProxy UI, where
they can label which key-values are actually PII and
can choose to filter out these values. Our app stores
these decisions in the PII DB and also logs it in an on-
device database. Based on the user’s decision, either
the original app request is unmodified, or PII in the
request are modified by replacing original values with
anonymized ones, and sent over the network (Step 6).
The private signatures stored on the on-device Signa-
ture DB are periodically uploaded by a separate Sig-
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Figure 4: Screenshots of the PrivacyProxy app from left to right: (a) Home screen showing summary information,
(b) a list of monitored apps along with summary information for each app, (c) drill-down information for a specific
app, showing key-value pairs that have been sent off the device, (d) the whitelist screen
nature Updater to the Signature Server (Step 7). The
signature updater uploads signatures opportunistically,
preferring uploading over WiFi and when the phone is
plugged in. The signature server processes these pri-
vate signatures and sends back public signatures. The
signature updater stores a local copy of the public signa-
tures for future use. This is done in a battery conserving
manner since the PrivacyProxy signature database only
requires weak consistency (Step 9). In addition, the Pri-
vacyProxy Signature server has a RESTful interface to
fetch the server side whitelists (Step 10).
Figure 4 shows the UI for the PrivacyProxy app.
The home screen (left) presents an overview of Priva-
cyProxy. Users can toggle the VPN functionality and
see the total #apps monitored, #pieces of information
sent to remote servers, #instances of PII detected, and
#hosts that apps on their device have contacted. In
the My Apps view (center-left), users can see summary
info of all non-system apps that have used the network.
Clicking on a particular app shows the detailed app
view (center-right), which shows the associated key-
value pairs that have been detected and the last few
values for each key. Here, users can confirm whether
the identified key-value pairs are PII or not or whether
they are unsure. If the user marks as PII, they can
also choose to filter that key-value, replacing it with an
anonymized value the next time we observe it (shown for
the second key in the same screenshot). Finally (right),
users can configure settings for PrivacyProxy.
Performance and Energy Optimization: We
implemented several optimizations to minimize battery
use. First, we turn off PrivacyProxy’s VPN when en-
tering Android’s DozeMode. While in DozeMode, back-
ground services sync and transfer data only during spe-
cific time windows. Based on our empirical measure-
ments, the VPN service consumes resources even if no
network traffic is monitored, and this optimization re-
duces this overhead.
Second, we use Android’s VPN bypass functionality
[31] to whitelist certain apps so their traffic does not
pass through the VPN. We use this feature to skip apps
e.g. email or ones that use SSL certificate pinning to
prevent MITM (e.g. Facebook and WhatsApp ).
Third, we have a FastPath option which helps dis-
able VPN interception and packet processing on a per-
app basis based on prior app behavior. Apps are added
to the FastPath locally on the device and have no con-
nection with our global whitelist. If we do not detect
any PII leak after a certain number of requests (ran-
domly chosen to be between 500 and 2000, but con-
figurable) from a particular app, we add that app to
the FastPath and do not inspect requests from that ap-
p/version. Consequently, apps on the FastPath are de-
pendent on each user’s request and may vary from user
to user. However, if an app tries to contact a new host
and path combination we remove it from the FastPath
and start inspecting all its requests again. Moreover,
whenever PrivacyProxy is started, we randomly remove
a subset of apps from FastPath and enable sampling
their requests again (currently set to 200 requests) to
make sure the app is continuing to not send out any
PII, and to help mitigate Sybil attacks.
4.2 PrivacyProxy Signature Server
The Signature Server (SS) combines private sig-
nature uploads from clients and updates public signa-
tures for associated signature IDs. These public sig-
natures are stored in the SS database and is periodi-
cally downloaded by PrivacyProxy clients. Count-min
sketch makes combining signatures trivial. In addition,
each count-min sketch in a signature can be updated
independently, so we don’t have to worry about users
having slightly different signatures with the same SID.
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Our SS is implemented in GO, supports HTTPS and
authentication, and is around 1,350 lines of GO code.
To minimize storage and bandwidth, we use Google’s
Protocol Buffer library to serialize all data transfer. As
mentioned earlier, our count-min sketch has r rows (cur-
rently 5) and n columns (currently 55) see Figure 2 (c).
We also use 64 bit integers. This means that each key
only takes up r × n × 8 = 2200 bytes regardless of the
number of values. To protect user privacy, we do not
store the IP addresses or any other identifiers of Priva-
cyProxy clients sending us private signatures.
Using the crowd to mitigate user burden: Sim-
ilar to the FastPath optimization earlier, we have also
implemented a server-side WhiteListing feature that
can provide hints to PrivacyProxy clients to reduce per-
formance overhead. The intuition is that if there are
enough users for a particular app/version (currently set
to 5 users) and if we have not detected PII in any of
their requests, it’s unlikely that the app leaks any PII.
For this feature, we aggregate data on the number of re-
quests seen and the number of potential PII flagged by
PrivacyProxy for a particular app/version. Note, we do
not need the actual PII to be shared with our server but
only the number of PII detected and flagged as TP/FP
for each app/version. If we conclude that a particular
app does not leak PII, we add it to our whitelist. Pri-
vacyProxy client apps can download this whitelist and
add them to the VPN bypass method (Step 10 Figure
3). The advantage for new users is that they will not
observe any performance overhead of PrivacyProxy pro-
cessing data from these apps. It is possible for an app
developer to game the system by not accessing any PII
at first. This case can be handled by having a random
and small subset of app requests being sampled even
if they are in the whitelist, though we have not imple-
mented this feature yet.
5. EVALUATION
We evaluated PrivacyProxy in five different contexts:
an initial controlled experiment, an extensive training
experiment, a small field study, a user survey from the
field study, and a comparison of PrivacyProxy with two
other related systems - Recon [7] and Haystack [14].
These evaluations highlight several key findings. First,
we show PrivacyProxy accurately detects PII in our ini-
tial controlled experiment (Section 5.1) with 500 most
popular apps (Precision 61.1%, Recall 100%, F1-score
0.759). Second, based on our intuition that additional
network requests from the same app will increase accu-
racy, we show PII detection accuracy indeed improves
(Precision 76.4%, Recall 100%, F1-score 0.866) for the
40 worst performing apps with the most false positives
(Section 5.2). Third we show in our field study, with
18 participants and users who dicovered PrivacyProxy
organically from the Play Store, that we achieve a preci-
sion of 79.3% and a recall of 100% (Section 5.3). Fourth,
based on our user survey, we show that 85% of the users
in the survey found no perceptible change in battery life
and 68% users found no change in network performance
(Section 5.4). Finally, we compare PrivacyProxy with
two prior works, and show that for a set of 15 apps
PrivacyProxy finds significantly more types of PII (89
PIIs) than both Recon (57 PIIs) and HayStack (36 PIIs)
respectively (Section 5.5).
5.1 Initial Controlled Experiment
Experiment Design: We selected the top 500 free
apps from Google Play retrieved on March 13th, 2018.
From this set, we were able to evaluate 452 apps. Among
the remaining 48 apps, 22 apps used certificate-pinning
on all network requests, 20 required information such as
bank accounts and phone numbers for account creation,
and 6 made no network requests at all. We used Nexus
5X running Android 6.0 for these experiments.
Each training run for an app consisted of installing
the app, exploring it for 150 seconds, and then unin-
stalling it. We used DroidBot [32] to perform 4 of
these training runs (each 150 seconds) for each app on
4 phones with PrivacyProxy. Next, we used the same
automated script on a fifth phone as a test run to evalu-
ate the detected PIIs. The test run was conducted after
the training phones had uploaded their signatures to the
server. Note, while exploring each app for longer and
doing even more runs would improve coverage, we em-
pirically determined that 150 seconds and 4 runs were
good enough to capture a good set of network requests.
While Droidbot was configured to interact with apps
the same way across runs, there were inevitable varia-
tions due to non-deterministic behavior in apps, changes
in the environment, or timing issues. For instance, when
Droidbot clicks a button, the desired function may or
may not complete successfully depending on the net-
work conditions. Similarly, Droidbot’s interactions can
differ as some apps change the phone environment by
turning on accessibility settings, changing the language
of the phone, turning off the WiFi, and so on.
We manually label each key-value pair as potential
PII or not for all requests (Total of 18407 unique re-
quests), and then compare them against PrivacyProxy’s
classification to calculate precision and recall. We are
conservative in our manual labeling of PIIs in that we
marked a value as a non-PII if we were not sure about
its category, leading to higher false positives. We used
a probability threshold of T = 0.95 based on empirical
data. To prevent inflation of the number of detected
PII/non-PII values, we only examine unique (SID, key,
value) tuples and not multiple instances of the same
tuple.
Experiment Results: The training runs generated
12603 public signatures from the 452 apps. There were
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Table 1: Detection efficiency in the controlled experiment and field deployment. Rows 2 and 3 show the performance
of PrivacyProxy for the 40 apps which had maximum number of false positives after 1 and 7 rounds of training runs.
Row Scenario Apps TP FP FN Precision Recall F1 Score
1 Controlled Experiment 452 3184 2021 0 61.1% 100% 0.759
2 Extensive Training - Round 1 40 321 184 0 63.6% 100% 0.778
3 Extensive Training - Round 7 40 321 99 0 76.4% 100% 0.866
4 Field Study 75 92 24 0 79.3% 100% 0.885
18407 unique key-value pairs collected from the test de-
vice. Of the key-values that PrivacyProxy identified as
PII, we identified 3184 True Positives, 2021 False Posi-
tives, 13202 True Negatives and 0 False Negatives (Ta-
ble 1), yielding a precision of 61.1%. Due to limitations
of the coverage of any automated testing framework, we
cannot guarantee that we have triggered all possible PII
leaks from the apps. Therefore, we calculated the false
negatives considering only the network requests we saw
in our experiments.
After manually analyzing false positives, we catego-
rized them into four categories. First, PrivacyProxy
mistakenly detects some values as PII because in certain
apps, the URL paths (which PrivacyProxy uses as sig-
nature ID) had variables, e.g. api.geo.kontagent.net/
api/v1/11828d55da4547b5b7bd85eef33c38a0/cpu/.
Since, these variable strings form a part of signature
ID, PrivacyProxy rarely sees enough instances of the
request to classify it properly. Second, PrivacyProxy
is unable to correctly classify resource paths on servers
(e.g. for an image) sent by the apps without sufficient
number of users. Third, values which do not seem to
have a semantic meaning may or may not be PII. We
conservatively label all such values as not PII for ground
truth. Finally, values belonging to network requests
made only one time. These values have a private prob-
ability of 1 and as discussed previously, PrivacyProxy
is unable to correctly classify such values without more
requests.
Interestingly, the Brightest Flashlight LED app trans-
mitted the SHA hash of the UDID. Apps like Draw.ly,
Drink Water Reminder, and Yelp used random hashes
as identifiers for the device. In such scenarios, regex-
based approaches can easily miss PII if we do not have a
priori knowledge. Additionally, users may not have suf-
ficient knowledge to label values like these as PII. Lastly,
the current permission-based controls in Android would
not be able to control such PII leaks.
5.2 Extensive Training Experiment
Since many of the False Positives in the controlled
experiment could be due to not seeing enough network
requests with the same SID, our hypothesis was that the
precision of PrivacyProxy’s classification will increase as
more instances of these requests are observed.
Experiment Design: We tested this hypothesis on
a set of 40 apps for which PrivacyProxy had most in-
stances of False Positives in the classification of PII dur-
ing the controlled experiment 5.1. The experimental
setup was similar to the controlled experiment, with the
duration of each training and testing run increased to
750 seconds. A test run was conducted after each train-
ing run was completed and the private signatures had
been uploaded to the server. Apps were only installed
once at the beginning of the experiment and persisted
throughout the experiment. For this experiment, we
started from a clean database without using any data
from the prior controlled experiment (Section 5.1).
We also evaluate how different confidence thresholds
affect precision and recall. As described at the end of
Section 3.2.3, the confidence threshold (CT ) dictates
the minimum number of times a (SID, key) pair must
be seen before it is classified as PII/non-PII. Intuitively,
a lower value will have higher recall since even infre-
quent values will be classified, while a higher threshold
will have better precision since PrivacyProxy will have
higher confidence about a key-value being PII or not.
Experiment Results: As illustrated in Figure 6,
the average precision for PrivacyProxy for these 40 apps
increases from 63.6% to 76.4% with additional training
runs. The reason for this is that the number of False
Positives reduce with longer training and more runs.
Figures 5a and Figure 5b show the effect of varying
the confidence threshold on precision and recall, for 1
round of training and 7 rounds of training respectively.
The recall drops more dramatically as we increase the
threshold values, and the drop off is more dramatic for
a single training round as compared to seven rounds.
Based on this data, we determine that the near opti-
mal confidence threshold value is 2. However, we note
that users can still tune this threshold based on their
tolerance for false positives and false negatives.
5.3 Field Study
Experiment Design: We published PrivacyProxy
on the Google Play in Nov 2016. While our field study
includes users that found our app organically on the
Play store, most of the data collected comes from the 18
participants that we recruited specifically using an on-
line portal (between Nov 2016 and January 2017). Re-
cruited users were asked to install and use PrivacyProxy
for at least 4 days on their own smartphone. This was
an IRB-approved study and participants were given a
$20 Amazon Gift Card. During the study, the public
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(a) Precision and Recall after 1 round of training (b) Precision and Recall after 7 rounds of training
Figure 5: Effect of confidence threshold on the overall precision and recall of PrivacyProxy after 1 round and 8 rounds
of training. Precision and Recall are calculated for 40 apps with the most False Positives in the initial evaluation.
Figure 6: Change in precision of PII detection with in-
creasing training runs for 40 apps with most false posi-
tives in 5.1.
signatures were collected in a database on our server, re-
ceiving 1803 public signatures from 191 apps. Next we
selected the top 100 apps among these apps, which had
the most number of signatures and installed them on a
test device. We used this test device to evaluate Pri-
vacyProxy’s PII detection accuracy, obviating the need
for actual users to share their original key-value pairs.
We interacted with these 100 apps manually on the test
device for one minute each. The number of users for
this subset of 100 apps ranged from 1 to 10. 54 apps
had only 1 user, but 3 apps had 6 users (Moneycon-
trol, Airdroid, News Break), 1 app had 8 users (An-
droid Backup Service), and 1 app had 10 users (Google
Services Framework).
Experiment Results: PrivacyProxy captured re-
quests for 75 apps, that communicated with 30 remote
hosts. We detect 116 potential PII leaks in 24 apps with
92 being True Positives and 24 False Positives. The pre-
cision of classification was 79.3% (see Row 4, Table 1).
5.4 User Survey on Usability
In Section 4, we described the optimizations we did
for reducing energy consumption of PrivacyProxy. With-
out these optimizations, the PrivacyProxy overhead was
30% higher. To quantify the impact on battery life,
we installed the top 20 free apps on our test devices.
For the first test, these apps were launched in the back-
ground and then the screen of the test device was turned
off. In the second test, we used the MonkeyRunner
script to open each of these 20 apps one by one and in-
teract with them by performing 100 clicks on the screen.
To measure overhead, we calculated the time it took
for the battery to go from from 100% to 85% with and
without PrivacyProxy. To mimic real world usage, we
enabled WiFi, LocationServices, etc on the test device
and ran each test thrice to report data. Table 2 presents
our results. Our data shows that for standby, Priva-
cyProxy reduces battery lifetime by 8.6% - 11.0%, while
in active use the overhead can be up to 14.2%. Note
that prior work has shown that VPNs themselves con-
sume about 10% battery [33], so the additional battery
consumption due to PrivacyProxy appears to be small.
Experiment Design: The participants from the
field study (Section 5.3) were shown an optional in-app
survey after 4 days of using the PrivacyProxy app, to as-
sess their perception of usability and performance. All
questions were on a 5-point Likert scale.
Experiment Results: There were 27 respondents,
including 18 participants we recruited and others who
organically found and used the app and chose to re-
spond to the survey. 85% of participants reported “No-
ticed no perceptible change” for battery usage, and 67%
for the network performance. Although there is a per-
formance overhead of using PrivacyProxy, 59% of users
said they did not notice any perceptible change in apps.
Furthermore, 54% of participants reported that the per-
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formance overhead was worth the privacy improvement
while 31% were neutral.
5.5 Comparison with Recon and HayStack
We compared PrivacyProxy with Haystack [14] and
Recon [7]. We selected 15 random apps from Top 100
free apps from Google Play Store on July 31st, 2017.
We tried to download and use Recon but were unable
to get it to work. Therefore, we contacted the au-
thors of Recon, and sent them these 15 apps so that
the authors may run their system and send us the PII
detections for these apps, which they gracefully did.
We installed PrivacyProxy and Lumen Privacy Mon-
itor (HayStack) on a test device, and then used Pri-
vacyProxy and HayStack one after the other to report
flagged PIIs for the same 15 apps. For PrivacyProxy,
we used 5 phones to generate signatures and then used
the test phone to evaluate.
For brevity, we have included a two representative
apps (row1, row2) from our test setup in Table 3 and
we include the PIIs detected by those apps. We also
include the total PIIs detected for all 15 apps (row3).
Our goal was to evaluate whether there are certain PII
that approaches based on user supplied labels (ReCon)
and deep packet inspection (Haystack) would miss as
compared to PrivacyProxy and vice versa. As noted
in Table 3, PrivacyProxy identified many more correct
PII than either approach (True Positives). Consider-
ing true positives, PrivacyProxy found 89 PII while Re-
con detected 57 and HayStack found 36. Being a more
generic approach, PrivacyProxy has more false positives
than the other two approaches while detecting more PII
than other specialized approaches.
6. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
PrivacyProxy is in theory subject to the cold start
problem, where a new user of an app has to wait until
we have enough signatures from other users of the same
app to have public signatures and to detect PIIs. We
also showed that our accuracy of PII detection improves
with more data. In practice, one would not start with
a clean signature database. For example, the data that
we collected by the Droidbot UI automation tool [32]
for the most popular 500 apps running on our training
and test devices, and the associated public signatures
can itself serve to bootstrap new users. This approach
can also be applied periodically on a much larger subset
of popular apps.
One security concern with PrivacyProxy is Sybil at-
tacks where a malicious entity attempts to poison our
signature database. Sybil attacks have been studied
in the context of recommender systems, with a num-
ber of proposed defenses [34, 35, 36, 37]. For Priva-
cyProxy, some options include: (a) gathering a great
deal of known good data (e.g. our bootstrapping ap-
proach above); (b) determining on the server whether
an uploaded signature is honest or not before merg-
ing it with public signatures; (c) verifying that hon-
est users are fairly long lasting and upload signatures
consistently; (d) providing good PII detection without
considering all signatures. DSybil [34] has a similar con-
text to PrivacyProxy where recommended objects can
be good or bad, the lifetime of users is relatively long
lived to build trust, and the user aims to find some good
objects rather than finding all good objects necessarily.
We believe that applying ideas from Dsybil can help
PrivacyProxy mitigate against these attacks. Another
mechanism is to compare the frequency estimates from
uploaded signatures to those existing in the database.
If the uploaded signature differs substantially, we can
reduce their relative weight when combining signatures
or hold off using them until we see similar signatures for
the same SID. We defer exploration of defending against
Sybil attacks to future work.
PrivacyProxy also has some limitations. First, it is
not designed to defend against malicious developers.
For example, PrivacyProxy can be evaded by certain
kinds of obfuscation. However, it is worth noting that
all other existing approaches today would not work un-
der active obfuscation, and that PrivacyProxy is harder
to evade than these existing approaches.
Second, we currently do not parse the request URI
path for PII, as it is not a structured key-value pair.
However, we observed that some apps send the user-
name and email as part of the path. We have the path
as part of our SID, and so it is possible to add values
from the path to our analysis, though it is still an open
question as to the best way of using this data.
Third, PrivacyProxy cannot detect leaks from certifi-
cate pinned apps. While certificate pinning improves se-
curity by mitigating man-in-the-middle attacks, it also
makes it harder for any intermediary to inspect network
flows for PII. In our pilot evaluations, we skipped any
app that used certificate pinning for any network re-
quest. However, upon closer inspection, we discovered
that less than 5% of the top 500 free apps use certifi-
cate pinning for every request. We bypass these apps
and add them to a global whitelist and notify the user.
The rest of the apps which use certificate-pinning do
so for only a subset of network requests, still allowing
us to monitor the requests not certificate pinned. We
note that the future of certificate pinning is unclear.
Google announced that pinning will be deprecated in
future versions of Chrome [38], due to challenges with
site maintenance and accidentally blocking legitimate
visitors. Given certificate pinning’s low adoption in the
most popular apps and its uncertain future, we feel that
this is not a major issue for our work.
Fourth, PrivacyProxy may not be able to successfully
detect PII if we fail to properly parse the request and
extract the key-value pairs. In practice, we did not
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Table 2: Battery Overhead Evaluation. We report the time taken (in minutes) in each case for the battery charge
to drop from 100% to 85%. The percentage in the parenthesis depicts the reduction in battery life (overhead of
PrivacyProxy), which varied from 8.6% to 14.2% in our 2 test devices. Note, for the background case the screen was
Off, and for the foreground tests the screen was On and the monkey was used to explore the apps.
Scenario
Samsung S7 Edge Nexus 5X
Background Foreground Background Foreground
Apps used without PrivacyProxy 463 min 52 min 650 min 70 min
Apps used with PrivacyProxy
416 min
(10.2%)
46 min
(11.5%)
594 min
(8.6%)
61 min
(12.8%)
Apps used with PrivacyProxy and Filtering enabled
412 min
(11.0%)
45 min
(13.4%)
587 min
(9.7%)
60 min
(14.2%)
Table 3: Comparison of PrivacyProxy, Recon, and HayStack in detecting unknown PII for 15 Apps. The first two
rows present example apps showcasing the ability of PrivacyProxy to find non-standard PII as compared to other
approaches. We categorize false positives based on the strict definition of PII we use in this paper. For example,
Gender and Time-Zone alone cannot identify a person, though can if combined with other values, as discussed in
Section 6.
Row Package Name Metric ReCon HayStack PrivacyProxy
1 com.abtnprojects.ambatana
TP
Advertiser ID, Android ID,
Device ID, Email
Account Information,
Advertiser ID, Android ID,
Hardware ID
Advertiser ID, Device ID,
First Launch Date, GAID, Hardware ID,
Identity ID, Install Date, UID
FP Location Build Fingerprint Local IP, Timestamp
2 tv.telepathic.hooked
TP Advertiser ID, Android ID
Account Information,
Android ID
Android ID, AppsFlyerID, Device ID,
First Launch Date, GAID, Hardware ID,
Identity ID, SessionID, UID
FP - Build Fingerprint Date, Timestamp
3 PII from all 15 apps
TP 57 36 89
FP 16 18 21
found many instances of this.
Fifth, PrivacyProxy works best for pinpointing unique
identifiers that are single values, but less so for other
PII. For example, some values by themselves are not
highly identifiable, but can be when combined with oth-
ers, e.g. device type, timestamps, location (see [39] for
more). These values usually belong to three types of
identity knowledge that neither PrivacyProxy nor past
work supports well: pattern knowledge, social catego-
rization, and symbols of eligibility [40]. PrivacyProxy
also does not work well for smartphone sensor data,
which can also leak private information [41, 42, 43].
Finally, a malicious signature server could conduct a
dictionary attack revealing the actual values from the
hashes. One attack is a known value attack, e.g. pre-
computing the hash for a specific email address and
looking for that hash in uploaded signatures. We cur-
rently do not have a way to defend against this at-
tack. Another attack is to precompute the hashes of
all possible values if the range is small, e.g. all possi-
ble birth years or ages. Again, our focus is on unique
identifiers, making dictionary attacks difficult since the
search space is quite large. Nevertheless, there are some
possible ways to mitigate this attack. First, we can
add some noise to signatures before they are uploaded
to a signature server to make precomputation harder,
e.g. adapting techniques similar to those in RAPPOR
[44]. However, this risks increasing false negatives. Sec-
ond, we might also only retrieve the counts from the
signature server instead of the whole signature, which
will limit the information attackers can infer from pub-
lic signatures and make it much harder to do offline
dictionary attacks. Third, we can segregate count-min
sketches of different keys to prevent correlation attacks
between different values (like inferring what addresses
someone goes to). We can then use an encrypted or
hashed value of SID and a key to find the right count-
min sketch without revealing the count-min sketch of
corresponding keys from the same signature.
With PrivacyProxy, we opted to push our design to
one extreme, seeing how far we could go using our crowd-
based approach, using minimal information about and
processing on each device. In practice, for an actual de-
ployed system, one could combine our approach with
other complementary approaches. For example, one
could use regular expressions to quickly find common
types of PII, especially for apps with few users, and use
our crowd-based approach to find uncommon types of
PII for widely used apps. Using regex would also make
it easier for PrivacyProxy to more easily filter out cer-
tain cases too, e.g. timestamps of the current time.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
PrivacyProxy is a scalable system for detecting and
mitigating leaks of PII from devices running stock An-
droid OS. We use a unique signature structure to effi-
ciently summarize all network requests leaving the user’s
device without revealing actual content. In addition,
we propose a novel crowd-based PII detection algorithm
that relies on user-generated signatures instead of heuris-
tics. This approach lets us detect both traditional forms
of PII as well as app-specific identifiers. By running on
12
the user’s device, we can filter out PII before it leaves
the device, and we have minimized the network over-
head and battery consumption of our app.
Based on our experimental evaluation, we found that
our precision for detecting valid PII increases as more
users use PrivacyProxy. In addition we show that Pri-
vacyProxy can find several types of PII that other ap-
proaches cannot. Furthermore, we show that perceived
impact on battery life as well on the network perfor-
mance is low.
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